Introduction

'If the necessity of individuals is recognised as exempting them from punishment for things never so injurious done by them from that necessity, this must be still more the case in war,
since so much more is at stake.' 1 *PhD candidate, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. The author wishes to dedicate this article to the memory of Grace McDermott (14/11/1990 -01/05/2017), beloved friend and PhD colleague, whose encouragement and support were vital during its writing. She is, and will forever be, deeply missed. Many thanks also to my supervisor, Dr. James Gallen, for his invaluable comments and advice. It is apparent from the evidence of these defendants that they considered military necessity, a matter to be determined by them, a complete justification of their acts. We do not concur in the view that the rules of warfare are anything less than they purport to be. Military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules. 24 And later:
Here again the German theory of expediency and military necessity (Kriegsraeson geht vor kriegsmanier) superseded established rules of international law. As we have previously stated in this opinion, the rules of International Law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant their violation. 25 The
High Command case (U.S. v Von Leeb et al), was the final of the twelve Nuremberg trials.
Under count one of the indictment -'aggressive war' -the tribunal held that:
'the doctrine of military necessity has been widely urged. In the various treatises of International Law there has been much discussion on this question. It has been the viewpoint of many German writers and to a certain extent has been contended in this case that military necessity includes the right to do anything that contributes to the winning of a war… We content ourselves on this subject with stating that such a view would eliminate humanity and decency and all law from the conduct of war and it is a contention which this Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the accepted usages of civilized nations. 26 Regarding the defendants' plea of military necessity, the Tribunal found:
This theory (of military necessity as an excuse for justification of scorched earth policy during retreat) is nothing more than the reapplication of the well-known German principle 'Kriegsraison geht vor kriegsmanier' which has been advanced by various German writers and faithfully transmitted into action by the German Armies during the last two world wars. According to this theory, the laws of war lose their binding force 24 USMT (n22) 25 Ibid 26 USMT (n23) in case of extreme necessity which was said to arise when the violation of the laws of war offers other means of escape from extreme danger, or the realization of the purpose of war -namely, the overpowering of the enemy. Such a theory is merely a denial of all laws, and a reaffirmation of the philosophy that the end justifies the means. …Law is a restraint which cannot be confused with more usages to be applied when convenient. The doctrine of "Kriegsraison" was still applied during the Second World
War. It is possibly the uncertainty as to the applicability of the Hague law in conditions which had changed considerably since 1907 that contributed to this to some extent.
However, it is probable that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt for the law, the weakening of which may be characteristic and a danger of our age. Self-preservation serves as the political arm of the Kriegsraison doctrine. The old doctrine of self-preservation allowed for recourse to force for any reason related to the preservation of the security of the State. It can, then, be considered a specific application of the broader concept of necessity -with anything necessary for the State's security warranting the use of force. Selfpreservation was considered a 'natural' or 'inherent' right, related to the 'right to security' in Vattel. 36 In his Collected Papers, Westlake describes the doctrine as such:
...when a state employs force in the territory of another state...or when it attempts by threats to restrain the freedom or action of another state within the territory of the latter, or that of the subjects of another state elsewhere than within its own territory… -the state so acting or threatening must find its justification in some other principle (other than its own sovereignty). The principle commonly put forward on such occasion is that of self-preservation, which writers on international law often class among their fundamental, primitive, primary or absolute rights. been both crew members and passengers on the ship, were shot without trial. The U.K. did not protest against the seizure of British subjects on the high seas, but only about their executions, admitting that the latter was an act "under the expectation of instant damage in self-defence".
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The Caroline incident, however, used the terms self-defence and self-preservation interchangeably. Despite this, in its attempts to define the limits of self-defence and to examine its legal content, self-defence was said to have been "rescued from the Naturalist notions of an absolute primordial right of self-preservation".
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Has self-defence really been 'rescued' from self-preservation? It would appear that the answer is no. Indeed, it can be argued that in a perverse manner, the UN Charter itself has been instrumental in the revival of self-preservation and Kriegsraison. In creating the UN Charter, those states involved aimed to make unilateral and aggressive uses of force unacceptable.
However, it was recognised that states' had an inherent right of self-defence. Article 51 of the Charter codified this self-defence exception. While the events of 1930s and 1940s had apparently led the international law community to recognise 'the absurdity of having a prohibition on aggression or first use of force but permitting a state to judge for itself whether 46 Ibid 91. 47 Alexandrov (n36) 20. 48 Ibid 20. 49 Ibid 21. 50 Jennings (n42) 92.
its use of force was in self-defence', the United States was concerned that the Charter -and the veto power of other future members of the Security Council -might impede its ability to use force in pursuit of its interests. 51 At the behest of the U.S., Article 51, permitting the use of force in self-defence, was added to the Charter. This exception was not present in the Dumbarton Oaks draft of the Charter. 52 Scott explains that the combination of the Article 51 exception on self-defence, along with the makeup and voting system of the Security Council, has meant that the U.S. has retained the capacity to block any decision disputing that its uses of force were not taken in self-defence. . 59 This leads Hurd to comment that Machiavelli's adage that 'that war is just which is necessary' would today be better phrased as 'that war is legal which is necessary.' 60 Of course, as has previously been mentioned, Kriegsraison makes the belligerent the sole judge of that necessity, and thus the sole judge as to whether or not its actions are legal. This has important consequences for the United States, which remains the sole judge of those actions which it takes in preventive self-defence.
The expansion of 'imminence' and the expansion of the 'self'
Since the publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy by the first administration of President George W. Bush, subsequently known as 'the Bush doctrine', the United States has made concerted efforts to create a right of preventive self-defence in international law. 61 Much of this effort has centred around placing a greater emphasis on the importance of the principle of necessity through the broadening of the "imminence" requirement, which the U.S. argues is necessary to respond to the threat it faces from non-state armed groups and the exceptional challenges these groups present. 62 This purported right of preventive self-defence is exceedingly reminiscent of the elevation of necessity and the doctrine of Kriegsraison in WWIGermany.
Hull observes that WWI-era Germany had developed a 'uniquely robust doctrine of military necessity thought to apply to many levels of action from the tactical (combat), to operational (battle), and at the level of the state itself (war and peace imported wholesale from law enforcement standards found in international and domestic human rights law, while continuing to maintain that it is involved in a transnational noninternational armed conflict to which international humanitarian law applies as lex specialis.
Yet given the multiplicity of geographical areas and legal scenarios within which the targeted killing programme operates, it is impossible to apply one legal framework to all of the targeted killings carried out under the auspices of the 'war on terror'. Targeted killings must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to legally analyse and classify them -there is certainly no 'one size fits all' approach available. 125 This is true even in cases where a State has lawfully resorted to force under the law of self-defence. Any targeted killing carried out in self-defence must still abide by the relevant regulatory legal framework of international humanitarian law and/or international human rights law, dependant on the context in question.
IHRL and the importance of 'imminence'
As with jus ad bellum and resort to force, a central question in international human rights law as to the legality or otherwise of an instance of targeted killing rests heavily on 'imminence'. 'show how powerful the human rights notion of necessity really is. Whether a human rights case is explicitly governed by a "least-restrictive-means" test or a test of "absolute necessity", both involve the strictest scrutiny over the government's behaviour. In order to justify its actions, the government needs to show that it had no other alternative to secure its legitimate aim; if other, less injurious alternatives existed, the government action or policy violates human rights law.' terrorist threat does not seem to have been significantly impacted in any of these countries. In Somalia, for example, the removal of the 2013 PPG to Somalia in March 2017 indicates the opposite, while the quantitative escalation of strikes in Yemen since January 2017 casts doubt on the effectiveness of the targeted killing programme against AQAP to date.
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As Chehtman writes, the available empirical data does not make it clear that military necessity supports resorting to drone strikes against extraterritorially based non-state armed groups.
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According to Chehtman, simple comparisons between the number of drone strikes and the number of terrorist attacks over time (or the number of strikes with the number of victims of terrorist violence) do not suggest that an increase in drone strikes diminishes the number of terrorist attacks, and a similar conclusion follows from studies using regression analysis. 164 He further notes that in the most positive study, which focuses on drone strikes in Pakistan, the effect of drone strikes is found to be 'rather small' in reducing the capacity of terrorist groups to undertake attacks, and as such drone strikes should not be relied upon as the primary strategy for defeating these groups. 165 In other studies, drone strikes have been found to have different effects on different groups, with strikes on the Taliban in Afghanistan having a negligible impact, but strikes on groups in Pakistan 'triggering more violence instead of reducing it.'
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Yet another issue arises with the application of the IHL principle of military necessity to situations that should ostensibly by governed by IHRL. The overbroad interpretation of imminence and the privilege it bestows upon the necessity principle at the jus ad bellum level has knock-on effects for the principle of proportionality and military necessity at the jus in bello level. Amos Guiora (who is in his own words 'a proponent of targeted killing') has argued that current U.S. policy, with its broad interpretation of imminence, risks privileging jus ad bellum proportionality to the extent that jus in bello proportionality is disregarded. He writes:
'the increasingly flexible notion of imminence and threat have significant effects on the "military advantage gained" (i.e., the value of the target) and therefore on the application of the proportionality principle governing the minimization of civilian harm. If all threats are so imminent and dangerous as to justify the use of lethal force 162 Zenko (n160 any, achieved by it must continue to be interrogated.
Drones: why the weapon matters
Given Kriegsraison's tendency to speak in code and hyperbole about probability and risk, and its interest in justifying whatever is necessary to reduce losses or even the risk of losses in the course of conflict, it would be remiss of this article if it did not briefly interrogate how the U.S.
portrays drones in its attempts to 'sell' the targeted killing programme. In a number of ways, the drone represents Kriegsraison's platonic ideal of a weapon, and indeed drones allow for the practical implementation of the Kriegsraison doctrine to an extent not previously possible.
Indeed, Chamayou describes the drone as 'the weapon of self-preservation', 169 allowing for the projection of power without the projection of vulnerability.
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As stated, drones are the perfect weapon for the Kriegsraison doctrine, allowing as they do for the rapid neutralisation of possible threats before that 'threat' becomes imminent and giving no cause for concern for one's own troops. It is interesting to note that parallels can again be drawn in this arena between WWI-era Germany and the U.S. today, particularly when looking at Germany's employment of the submarine at that time. The submarine was first used between 1904 and 1905, but it was during the First World War that German statesmen, lawyers and military leaders began to push in earnest for the submarine to be accepted by international law.
There is no doubt that the manner in which Germany used the submarine to destroy merchant ships and the crew on those ships during the war was illegal and broke with tradition. However, the fact that the submarine was new meant that it was unmentioned in the Declaration of London (DoL) and the Hague Conventions, but, as Hull notes, both the DoL and customary law at the time had major implications for submarine warfare. 171 Germany, however, argued forcefully that the submarine was a new weapon, and that "new means require new forms. The majority of scholarship and commentary on the subject accepts that in an armed conflict scenario, drones are legal and subject only to the strictures of IHL. Whether drones can comply with IHRL is another matter. While they are not illegal per se under IHRL, the instances in which it would be lawful to use a drone in a non-conflict situation to which IHRL applies will be extremely rare, given that using a drone-fired missile will likely instantly kill both the target and any other individual in his or her vicinity. Drones also present legal challenges of another kind -they necessitate a rethinking of our conceptions of 'power' and 'control' regarding jurisdiction in international human rights law, and raise the very real possibility that their use relaxes the standards for resort to force in the jus ad bellum, making targeted killing across borders easier than in the past, potentially undermining the role of State sovereignty, and thereby the international security system. 194 There are also concerns that as drones allow for Although some moves were made toward transparency in the final year of the Obama administration, the targeted killing programme, as is to be expected, remains secretive and opaque. As such, a lack of information means that creating a definitive stance on the legality or otherwise of individual strikes can be difficult. However, it is still possible to holistically assess the legal arguments and practice of the U.S. At the very least, the United States is being disingenuous in its classification of conflicts, and deliberately dishonest in its application and interpretation of imminence and necessity at the jus ad bellum level. The United States continues to portray a flagrant disregard for widely accepted norms and rules, even while it pays lip-service to them. Worryingly, it also appears to be operating under the mistaken belief that necessity and military necessity can operate as the sole justifications for military action.
The United States has never expressly invoked Kriegsraison, but like WWI-era Germany it holds opinio juris to be a function of state wartime practice, as is evidenced by its consistent attempts to have the international community accept a non-existent right of preventive selfdefence, an overbroad and uniquely flexible conception of 'imminence', and the creation of regions to which IHL applies, despite these regions being 'outside areas of active hostilities'.
With this fallacious reasoning, the U.S. ushers in the return of Kriegsraison.
We should remain wary of arguments that 'new means require new forms', particularly when these 'new' forms represent a return to a much-discredited and disgraced doctrine of international law. 197 The United States has consistently argued that the current international law regime requires modification in order to address the threats and challenges faced today. This is not the case. The regimes of international humanitarian law and international human rights law as they currently exist are more than capable of addressing the current terrorist challenges faced by States. 198 Those who argue against their applicability, or who assert that neither body can adequately engage with the issues of drone strikes and transnational terror do so in order to better justify their own contempt for these rules. Heyns et al, in arguing that 'drones should follow the law, rather than the other way around', write:
'The legal framework for maintaining international peace and the protection of the right to life is a coherent and well-established system, reflecting norms that have been developed over the centuries and have withstood the test of time. Even though drones
